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ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal arises out of a six-year legal battle in which the Appellant, Gregory M. 
Ward ("Ward"), has repeatedly attempted to obtain approval to build a small cabin on his 
property located in Brighton, Utah (the "Property"). The Property is subject to simple, 
basic restrictions contained in a Special Warranty deed. First, the Property "shall be 
limited to the construction of a single residential building containing not in excess of 
twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and not containing more than two floors." 
Special Warranty Deed (Trial Exhibit 44). Second, the Special Warranty Deed gives 
Brighton Corporation, a family corporation controlled by Ward's aunt, Mary Barton 
(sometimes referred to as "Brighton"), an adjoining landowner, the right to review and 
approve plans for the cabin and provides that Brighton will not unreasonably withhold 
such approval. Id 
For six years, Ward has been submitting detailed plans to Brighton attempting to 
obtain approval to build his cabin. Since the initial hearing on this matter in 1994, all of 
Ward's plans have undisputedly complied with the "1,200 square feet" and "two floors" 
requirements of the restrictive covenants.1 See, e.g., Brighton's Opposition Brief at 61 
(conceding that Ward's 1995 plans met "the two objective criteria stated in the Special 
1
 In 1994, the first plans submitted by Ward to Brighton were ruled by the district 
court to contain two floors, plus an attic and a basement that were "floors," equaling four 
floors in violation of the restrictive covenants. Brighton spends a great deal of time in its 
opposition brief referring to the 1994 decision of the trial court. However, Ward does not 
appeal the district court's ruling in 1994. 
1 
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Warranty Deed.") These plans have been drawn by professional draftsmen and/or 
licensed architects. Salt Lake County has certified that these plans comply with all 
building and zoning requirements. Nevertheless, Brighton has refused to approve the 
plans and the district court has failed to compel Brighton to approve these plans. Ward 
has attached hereto as Exhibit A photographs of depictions of the various cabins that 
Ward has submitted for approval over the years, all of which have been unreasonably 
rejected by Brighton. 
Although unnecessary to a determination of this dispute, it must be asked why this 
litigation has continued for six years over such a simple matter, at a cost of over $350,000 
in fees and costs to the parties. Ward only wants to build a family cabin on his property. 
Brighton suggests that this litigation is a result of Ward's mother, Isabel Coats, being 
upset with the results of a family lottery in which she received the Property at issue in this 
case, rather than the larger parcel drawn by Mary Barton where the existing family cabin 
is located. See Opposition Brief at 11. This is not true and there is no evidence in the 
record to support such an allegation. 
The underlying cause of this dispute is that Mary Barton, the owner of Brighton 
Corporation, does not want any cabin built on the adjoining property and has vowed to 
never let Mr. Ward build on his property. In the fall of 1990, Ward visited his Aunt Mary 
Barton at the family cabin. At that time, Mary Barton told Ward "Greg, I'll never allow 
you to build on the property up here so you might as well find another place to build." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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September 7, 1994 Preliminary Injunction Hearing (R. 1744:310) (excerpt attached hereto 
as Exhibit B). 
True to her word, Mary Barton and Brighton Corporation have consistently refused 
to approve building plans that met all restrictive covenants, county requirements, and that 
any reasonable person would have approved. The district court has repeatedly erred in 
failing to order that Ward may build his cabin on his property. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT RULED THAT THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
WERE UNAMBIGUOUS. CONSEQUENTLY. ANY REFERENCE TO PAROL 
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
After the initial preliminary injunction hearing in September, 1994, the district 
court found that "the restrictive covenants in the Special Warranty Deed are clear and 
unambiguous, and the terms of those covenants are to be construed according to their 
ordinary, popular usage." October 4, 1994 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction and 
Declaratory Judgment at 19 (R. 312). It is hornbook law that parol evidence is not 
admissible to interpret the terms of an unambiguous contract. As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained, "[djeeds are to be construed like other written instruments, and where a 
deed is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms." See. 
e ^ , Hartman v. Potter. 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). "It is also well known that the 
intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words 
used are ambiguous." Id 
3 
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Despite this clear law, Judge Young further found that the intent of the parties as to 
the restrictive covenants was that "the 'two floors' be similar to the original cabin on the 
property now owned by Brighton Corporation where the first floor was built into grade 
with the front door on the west side of the grade," and that "[t]he intent of the parties was 
that only a small cabin could be built on the Subject Property." October 4, 1994 Order 
Granting Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Judgment at ^ 14-15 (R. 314). 
Thereafter, throughout the next six years of litigation, the trial court would, from 
time to time, refer to and rely on the intention of the parties that the cabin be small and 
look like the original family cabin on Brighton's property. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, 
Vol. II (R. 1751:238) (Judge Young stated that "[b]ut I have had a hearing, as you'll 
recall, several years ago, frankly before you were involved in this case, in which I had 
family members testify to what they thought the limitations of the new cabin would be. 
And Mr. Ward, I think he would have to acknowledge, is not happy with the confinement 
of that cabin"). Of course, based on the court's earlier ruling that the restrictive 
covenants were unambiguous, evidence of the intent of the parties as to what they 
intended the cabin to look like would be inadmissible parol evidence. 
Throughout this litigation, Brighton has wrongfully refused to approve Ward's 
cabin plans because, even though the cabin plans complied with the objective 
requirements of the restrictive covenants (i.e., two floors and 1,200 square feet per floor), 
Brighton applied a totally subjective standard in reviewing the plans and rejected the 
plans because the cabin did not look like the original family cabin on the property. 
4 
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Brighton's consistent reliance on the inadmissible intent of the parties, rather than the 
objective, unambiguous restrictive covenants, is illustrated by the following citations 
!| 
from Brighton's opposition brief: 
I 
Ward submitted plans and "Brighton rejected them, at the same time suggesting an 
acceptable style, one that complied with the intent of the restrictions as construed 
by the district court." Opposition Brief at 6 (emphasis added). 
"Nevertheless, it was felt that a small cabin could be placed on the Subject 
Property . . . . The siblings believed that any cabin on the Subject Property should 
be small so it would not obstruct the view or value of the main cabin and to avoid 
large numbers of people on the property." Opposition Brief at 10-11 (emphasis 
added). 
"The two-floor limitation referred back to the design (though not the size) of the 
Family Cabin . . . ." Opposition Brief at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
"[T]he 'two floor' restriction was included with the intent that the 'two floors' be 
similar to the original cabin on the property now owned by Brighton Corporation 
where the first floor was built into grade with the front door on the west side on 
grade." Opposition Brief at 15. 
Alleging that in 1995, Ward failed to "submit plans for a 'small cabin,' 'built into 
grade with the front door on the west side on grade " Opposition Brief at 15. 
Alleging that in 1995, Ward's cabin did not show a door as in the original cabin. 
Opposition Brief at 15-16. 
Brighton would review plans that complied with intent of the parties regarding the 
restrictive covenants. Opposition Brief at 16. 
"While Ward's 1995 plans had been tweaked technically to meet the two objective 
criteria stated in the Special Warranty Deed . . . there were other problems giving 
rise to Brighton's rejection." Opposition Brief at 61. 
Alleging that Ward wants a judge who has not "already ruled . . . that the 
restrictive covenants of the Special Warranty Deed were intended to limit any 
structure to a 'small cabin' " Opposition Brief at 63. 
5 
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Brighton has consistently rejected Ward's plans based on what it believes to be the 
intent of the parties regarding what a cabin was supposed to look like, rather than the 
objective, unambiguous terms of the restrictive covenants. The parties reduced their 
intent to have a "small cabin" to a writing by requiring that the cabin be two floors and 
1,200 square feet per floor. Ward's cabin plans consistently met these objective 
requirements. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WARD'S 1995 APPLICATION 
FOR A DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT TO BUILD THE CABIN HAD 
BEEN UNREASONABLY WITHHELD 
Standard of Review: The trial court's determination in 1995 that Brighton had not 
unreasonably withheld approval of Ward's cabin plans constitutes an interpretation of an 
unambiguous contract (the restrictive covenants) that should be reviewed for correctness 
giving no deference to the trial court1 determination of the issues presented. Saunders v. 
Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Brighton erroneously argues that the 
appellate court should apply an "abuse of discretion" standard because "[t]he question 
before the court was whether the preliminary injunction should be vacated to allow Ward 
to build." Opposition Brief at 3. Ward did not file a motion to vacate a preliminary 
injunction. Rather, Ward filed a motion for an order that Brighton had unreasonably 
refused to approve new plans that had been submitted after the 1994 hearing. The review 
of those plans was based on the court's interpretation of the unambiguous restrictive 
covenants contained in the contract between the parties. 
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After the 1994 hearing, Ward revised his cabin plans to eliminate the basement and 
the attic and resubmitted the plans to Brighton. Brighton still refused to approve the plans 
and on June 9, 1995, Ward filed an "Application for Determination that Approval Has 
Been Unreasonably Withheld." (R. 317-18). In its Opposition Brief, Brighton concedes 
that Ward's 1995 plans met the restrictive covenants, admitting that "Ward's 1995 plans 
had been tweaked technically to meet the two objective criteria in the Special Warranty 
Deed " Opposition Brief at 61. 
Brighton fails to rebut Ward's argument that Brighton unreasonably withheld 
approval of the plans. As explained in Ward's opening brief, each of Brighton's 
objections to the plans were without merit—(1) the plans did not show a loft; (2) 
Brighton's expert admitted a roof pitch of 8/12 did not violate Wasatch Canyon 
Development Standards;2 (3) Brighton did not show that the topography on the plans was 
wrong; and (4) Salt Lake County approved the plans. See Opposition Brief at 62. In fact, 
Brighton seems to concede that Ward is correct on these points, and argues only that 
"these are merely a selection of some facts purportedly favorable to Ward from among all 
that was before the trial judge." Id. However, tellingly, Brighton fails to cite from the 
2As pointed out in Ward's opening brief, Brighton's expert, Neil Richardson 
misrepresented to the trial court in the 1995 hearing that the preferred Alpine design in 
Utah is to retain snow on the roof with a 3/12 pitch. Mr. Richardson subsequently 
admitted that his testimony on that point was untrue by testifying that there is not a 
preferred alpine pitch design. See Testimony of Neil Richardson, Trial Transcript, Vol. I 
(R: 1750:187). 
7 
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record any evidence that Ward allegedly failed to include in his brief that was favorable 
to Brighton. 
Brighton based its rejection of the plans primarily on the fact that it believed the 
intent of the parties was that the cabin look like the "original cabin," and Brighton did not 
like the look of Ward's cabin, even though it met the restrictive covenants. Opposition 
Brief at 60. As explained above, the restrictive covenants were unambiguous and any 
reliance on the intent of the parties is barred by the parol evidence rule. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BRIGHTON'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION 
Standard of Review: The parties agree that the standard of review in reviewing an 
order granting summary judgment is correctness. Opposition Brief at 2. Brighton argues 
that this Court should reject this well accepted standard of review and instead review the 
district courts summary judgment order using deference. Id. There is no legal basis for 
the Court to review the summary judgment order by any standard other than correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's determination. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 
P.2d231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
On December 22, 1998, Brighton moved for summary judgment, seeking to have 
the Court rule on three points as a matter of law: (1) that Ward must compensate Brighton 
for all further costs, including attorney's fees, associated with any review by Brighton of 
any new plans submitted by Ward as a condition of reviewing those plans; (2) that it was 
reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed architect to sign any plans for the cabin; and 
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(3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone 
ordinance ("FCOZ") in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. (R. 802-04). 
In his opening brief, Ward argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion 
for summary judgment for two reasons: (1) there were disputed facts regarding the factual 
basis for the motion; and (2) there is no legal basis for the court to award attorney's fees 
to Brighton, require the plans to be signed by a licensed architect, or allow Brighton to 
apply FCOZ in examining the plans. Brighton only briefly discusses the factual basis for 
its motion and does not even attempt to address the lack of legal authority for awarding 
attorney1 fees in this case. 
Brighton's motion was based on its argument that Ward had previously submitted 
"ambiguous" plans that made it harder for Brighton to determine whether the plans were 
adequate and created increased expense for Brighton. This assertion was controverted by, 
among other things, (1) the affidavit of Ward's architect, who testified that the plans were 
"clear and unambiguous (Affidavit of Kimble Shaw, R. 956); (2) a certified plan 
reviewer, who determined that Ward's plan were "clear and can be easily understood," 
(letter from John J. Saunders, July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.6); and (3) Salt Lake 
County officials who repeatedly approved Ward's plans as meeting all applicable land 
use, zoning, and building requirements (Exhibits D and E to Ward's Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment). The sole factual basis for Brighton's summary judgment 
motion-prior submission of ambiguous plans-was clearly contradicted by the evidence 
submitted by Ward, creating a disputed issue of fact that precluded summary judgment. 
9 
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Further, Brighton fails to respond to Ward's argument that there was no legal basis 
for the trial court to aware Brighton its attorney's fees as a condition of further review of 
Ward's plans. Brighton does not, and indeed cannot, dispute that such a ruling flies in the 
face of the well-accepted rule that each party must bear its own attorney's fees in the 
absence of a statute or contractual provision to the contrary Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 
P.2d 834, 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Of the three rulings by the district court—allowing attorney's fees, allowing the 
application of FCOZ, and requiring the plans to be signed by a licensed architect—the 
ruling of most concern to Ward is the order that he be required to pay Brighton's 
attorney's fees. Incredibly, Brighton argues that Ward was not prejudiced by this ruling 
because he "has never reimbursed Brighton for any costs." Opposition Brief at 50. 
Brighton attempts to lead this Court to believe that the payment of attorney's fees has not 
been an issue in this litigation. Prior to trial, Ward once again submitted revised plans to 
Brighton. On October 11, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that it refused to review the 
plans unless Ward paid $5,446.50 in attorney's fees associated with Brighton's review of 
the plans submitted earlier. See October 11, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas 
J. Parry (attached hereto as Exhibit C). At trial, Brighton's counsel confirmed that it had 
refused to review the latest set of plans submitted by Ward because Ward had not paid 
Brighton's attorney's fees for prior review of plans. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 
1751:285). Brighton relied on the summary judgment order awarding it attorney's fees to 
justify its refusal to review Ward' plans. It cannot now in good faith argue that Ward was 
m 
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not prejudiced by the summary judgment order allowing Brighton to claim those 
attorney's fees.3 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A CONDITIONAL 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTED A BINDING CONTRACT 
Standard of Review: Whether a contract exists between parties is a question of 
law and is therefore reviewed for correctness. See Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Ouintek. 
834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Brighton argues that whether a contract exists 
in this case is a mixed question of fact and law. Opposition Brief at 1, 40. In the instant 
case, Ward is not challenging any findings of fact. Instead, Ward is challenging the trial 
court's determination that the parties, by their conduct, entered into a binding contract. 
The conduct of the parties is a matter of record. Whether that conduct created a binding 
contract is a question of law. Brighton relies on a concurring opinion in Kroupa v. 
Kroupa. 574 N.W. 2d 208 (S. Dak. 1997), in support of its position. However, the 
concurring opinion cited by Brighton recognizes that the majority of the court in that 
same case made a de novo examination of whether there was a binding settlement 
3Brighton argues that the summary judgment is "partially mooted" by the 
settlement agreement. The use of the word "partial" refers to the fact that Brighton still 
claims that Ward must pay its attorney's fees. This is the most critical issue in the 
summary judgment order that Ward is challenging. Also, Ward disputes that the 
purported settlement agreement mandates that a "retaining wall over six feet high violates 
FCOZ." Opposition Brief at 50. The Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ("FCOZ") 
ordinance speaks for itself In fact, FCOZ allows for retaining walls in excess of six feet 
where the wall is terraced between two tiers of not more than four foot tiers. (See Trial 
Exhibit No. 15 (pertinent portions of FCOZ)). The evidence at trial established that the 
retaining wall satisfied FCOZ requirements and had been approved by Salt Lake County 
in this regard. 
11 
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agreement between the parties in open court. See Kroupa. 574 N.W. 2d at 215. Whether 
there was a meeting of the minds and, therefore a binding contract, is a question of law 
and should be reviewed for correctness. See John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc.. 
876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
1. The proposed agreement constituted preliminary negotiations to which 
further manifestations of assent were required. 
On March 3, 1999, the parties informed the trial court of a proposed settlement. In 
explaining the nature of the proposed settlement to the trial court, Brighton's own counsel 
referred to the agreement as a "conditional settlement." "It's conditional because certain 
actions remain to be taken." March 3,1999 Transcript (R. 1745:3, lines 17-19). As set 
forth in Ward's opening brief, thereafter, Brighton's counsel makes an additional seven 
references to the proposed, conditional nature of the settlement: 
MR. JARDINE: We propose to state the agreement on the record and then to 
formalize it later in an order for the Court to sign, if the remaining issues and 
actions are satisfactorily resolved. And we would ask the Court to continue the 
trial date, and I think Mr. Parry will speak to that Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: There remains an issue outstanding that the future plans 
submitted to us will address, which is the location and design of the porch or front 
entrance proposed on the north side. Id at 5, lines 15-16 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: . . . if the issues raised in the letters of October 28, 1998, and 
February 22, 1999, and the noted ambiguities are addressed and resolved, Brighton 
is not presently aware of other grounds on which it would disapprove plans." Id. at 
6, lines 11-15 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: There are other issues to address in terms of the proposed 
settlement. A term of the proposed settlement is that Mr. Ward will withdraw all 
plans filed to date with the county . . . . LI at 6, lines 16-19 (emphasis added). 
19 
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MR. JARDINE: Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline easement, 
which comes across the property, the proposed resolution is that the claim of 
trespass and relocation would be dismissed, if everything else is resolved . . . Id. at 
10, lines 20-23 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: I understand that if all of this is achieved and accomplished and 
finally resolved, that all other claims between the parties would be dismissed and 
that a final order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of the terms of 
the settlement, attaching the plans. . . . . Id at 13, lines 6-10 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: One of the issues is whether the road would be paved. It's our 
understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the road, at Brighton 
Corporation's expense. Id. at 15, lines 16-19 (emphasis added).4 
In its brief, Brighton states that this was not an "agreement to agree . . . in light of 
the parties5 statements during the March 3,1999 hearing " Yet, Brighton does not 
even address the specific statements of the parties set forth by Ward in his brief. Those 
statements speak for themselves and clearly establish the preliminary nature of the 
settlement discussions. 
This was not the first time the parties had proposed a settlement and continued a 
trial date in hopes that a settlement could be reached. The parties were previously set to 
try this case on February 26, 1998. As set forth in the minutes of a February 18, 1998 
pretrial conference and the corresponding order, a "possible resolution" of the case was 
discussed at that time. Under that proposal, Ward would again submit plans to Brighton, 
Brighton would review the plans, there would need to be "final attached plans," and the 
trial setting was "vacated pursuant to possible resolution." February 18, 1998 Minutes of 
Pretrial Conference (R. 746) and March 4, 1998 Order (R. 747-749) (attached hereto as 
4The March 3, 1999 Transcript is attached as Exhibit C to Ward's opening brief. 
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Exhibit D). Ward subsequently submitted revised plans, but Brighton again rejected 
them. Brighton never argued that the 1998 proposal constituted a binding contract. 
This is exactly what happened one year later, in March 1999. A possible 
settlement was presented the trial court; Ward agreed that he would resubmit plans that 
would attempt to satisfy Brighton's concerns; a settlement could only be reached if 
Brighton approved Ward's plans in time for the 1999 building season; "a final order 
would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of the terms of the settlement, attaching 
the plans, . . . . " (R: 1745:13, lines 6-10); and the court continued the trial date in the hope 
that this matter would be settled. However, no settlement was reached and trial was 
necessary. 
There is no substantial difference between the way the proposed settlements in 
1998 and 1999 were presented to the trial court, other than the parties stated the nature of 
the proposal on the record in 1999. The parties presented a conditional, proposed 
agreement that was never consummated, i.e., never resulted in "final plans" and a "final 
order . . . entered with the Court, setting forth all of the terms of the settlement [and] 
attaching the plans " March 3, 1999 Transcript at 13 (R. 1745:13). 
2. There were never any plans approved, which was an essential condition 
of the proposed settlement. 
A crucial question is "Where is the "final order [that] would be entered with 
Court, setting forth all of the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans . . . . " March 3, 
1999 Transcript (R. 1745:13, lines 6-10. There is no such order. There are no "attached 
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plans." By agreement of the parties, there would be no settlement without final approved 
plans. Brighton cites BrownTs Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
in support of its argument that just because the parties intended to document their 
agreement at a later time, the failure to do so does not mean that the parties do not have 
an enforceable agreement. However, Brown's Shoe presupposes that an agreement has 
been reached, with the intention of later memorializing the agreement. In this case, as 
shown in the March 3, 1999 transcript, the parties repeatedly stated that there would be an 
agreement only "if all of this is achieved and accomplished and finally resolved," (R. 
1745:13, lines 6-10) and "if this goes through." (R. 1745:15, lines 16-19). No agreement 
was reached and consequently no memorialization could have or did take place. 
3. Brighton never agreed to approve the plans, and there was no 
mutuality of consideration. 
A contract must be supported by mutual consideration. "A promisor, by reserving 
an arbitrary right to terminate the contract, can unilaterally negate his promises. Thus, a 
negatable promise does not constitute consideration for a return promise for an executory 
contract." Resource Management Co. v. Ranch and Livestock Co.. Inc.. 706 P.2d 1028, 
1037 (Utah 1985). Consideration that does not bind a party is referred to as "illusory 
consideration" or a failure of "mutuality of obligation." Id. 
In reality, Brighton was not agreeing to do anything in the proposed agreement. 
Brighton never agreed that it would approve Ward's plans. Rather, Brighton hedged and 
was careful to reserve the right to disapprove plans, stating that "it was not presently 
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aware of other grounds on which it would disapprove the plans." March 3, 1999 Hearing 
Transcript (R. 1745:6, lines 13-15) (emphasis added). This is illusory consideration. 
Brighton could (and in fact did) subsequently assert "other grounds" to disapprove the 
plans. There was no mutuality of obligation in the proposed conditional settlement. 
4. The proposed agreement was too ambiguous to be enforced and the 
parties failed to have a meeting of the minds. 
In the Brown's Shoe case, cited by Brighton, the Court made clear that "a contract 
can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with 
sufficient definiteness." Id. at 363. In his opening brief, Ward argued that the proposed 
resolution of this matter incorporated by reference two letters that could contain between 
50 and 70 requirements depending on how the letters are interpreted. Brighton replies 
that "the mere fact of numerous requirements does not indicate ambiguity, but 
demonstrates the extent of detail and clarity required by Brighton and agreed to by Mr. 
Ward." Opposition Brief at 42. Brighton misses the point. It is the fact that there is a 
dispute as to whether there are fifty requirements or seventy requirements or some 
number in between that illustrates the ambiguity of the proposed agreement. Brighton 
cannot tell the Court (or Ward for that matter) exactly how many terms there are in the 
proposed agreement. 
The most glaring and important example of this ambiguity is perhaps the dispute 
over whether Ward was, as a part of the proposed conditional agreement, required to pay 
Brighton's attorney's fees incurred as a part of any review. Brighton concedes that "[t]he 
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settlement did not address the issue of legal fees." Opposition Brief at 44. Nevertheless, 
Brighton has consistently maintained that after the proposed settlement it still has the 
right to legal fees from Ward. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:285). Ward, 
on the other hand, believed that to the extent Brighton had the right to require him to pay 
its fees as a condition of review, it compromised that right in the settlement that the trial 
court ruled to exist. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:477-78). The parties have a 
fundamental disagreement on this and other essential terms of the agreement. 
For example, Ward understood that Brighton would agree to approve the south 
patio as long as the patio complied with FCOZ. FCOZ allows retaining walls in excess of 
six feet when terracing is employed. Ward's plans employed terracing on the patio that 
satisfied the requirements of FCOZ. Brighton argues that the settlement prohibits any 
retaining wall in excess of six feet, despite the clear provisions of the ordinance itself. 
Also in dispute is whether Ward conditioned his agreement to participate in any 
settlement on his receiving approval to build during the 1999 building season. Affidavit 
of Greg Ward (R. 1365); March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:17-18). Brighton disagrees 
with Ward that it was required to approve the plans in time for Ward to build in 1999. 
Yet another ambiguous point revolves around the survey of the property. Brighton 
requested that the parties agree on the accuracy of what is referred to as the "Sneidman 
survey." Brighton represented that the survey was accurate and that "Brighton 
Corporation's waterline has never been moved." See October 28, 1998 letter at 2. Ward 
was also required to have an updated survey of the property. After the updated survey 
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was conducted, it was discovered that Brighton had misrepresented the accuracy of the 
Sneidman survey and that contrary to Brighton's representations, its waterline had indeed 
been moved by some 14 feet from its prior location and extended an additional 18 feet on 
Ward's property without an easement or authorization from Ward. In addition, 
Brighton's access roadway is shown in the wrong place on the Sneidman survey, the 
circular drive is misrepresented, and the area protected by the Property Use Agreement on 
Ward's property referred to as the "buffer zone" is incorrect. (Cf. Sneidman survey (Trial 
Exhibit No. 56) with updated survey (Trial Exhibit No. 46). The parties cannot agree on 
the accuracy of the Sneidman survey. Brighton believes it to be accurate and Ward has 
proven that it is inaccurate. There simply is no meeting of the minds on this point and the 
other points discussed above and in Ward's opening brief. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING BRIGHTON TO PAVE THE 
PRIVATE ROADWAY ACROSS WARD'S PROPERTY 
Standard of Review: Brighton does not dispute that the constitutionality of a trial 
court's actions are considered conclusions of law reviewed for correctness. Brighton 
argues that the standard of review is abuse of discretion because the decision of a trial 
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement is reviewed under that standard. 
Opposition Brief at 1. However, Brighton ignores the fact that when the trial court issued 
its order allowing pavement of the roadway, it had not yet made a determination that a 
settlement even existed. In addition, in John Deere Co. v. A&H Equipment, Inc., 876 
P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cited by Brighton, the court held that although it is 
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generally true that a trial couifs summary enforcement of a settlement agreement will 
only be reversed for abuse of discretion, the court had to first determine that there was a 
binding settlement agreement, and this issue "is a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Id. at 883. 
Brighton argues that Ward's due process rights were not violated when Judge 
Young granted Brighton's motion to pave a roadway across Ward's property before 
Ward's counsel had been served with the motion or had any fair opportunity to be heard 
on the issue because (1) the trial court briefly questioned Ward's counsel about the 
surprise motion to pave the roadway at the scheduling conference and (2) because Ward's 
counsel filed an objection to the order that was entered without due process. Opposition 
Brief at 47-48. Due process requires a legitimate inquiry into the merits of the question 
presented, notice of the inquiry, and a fair opportunity to be heard. See, e.g. In re: 
L.G.W.. 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). "'Where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to 
inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him . . . a party is deprived of due 
process.'" In re: Richard Worthen. 926 P.2d 853. 877 (Utah 1996V Due process cannot 
be satisfied by reducing a person's right to be heard to nothing more than an opportunity 
to make a few comments at the spur of the moment and to file an objection to an order 
granted without due process of law in the first instance. Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983), cited by Brighton, does not hold otherwise. In Kinkella. the trial court 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law after a trial on the merits before opposing 
counsel could file objections to the proposed findings and conclusions. The trial court 
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subsequently reviewed the objections and allowed the findings and conclusions to stand. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that there had been "substantial compliance" with the local 
rules of practice that required that counsel have an opportunity to submit objections to 
proposed findings and conclusions. Id. at 235. Kinkella was not a due process case and 
in fact, unlike this case, in Kinkella. all parties had notice and a fair opportunity to be 
heard on the merits in the first instance. 
G- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE LATEST 
SET OF PLANS AT TRIAL IN 1999 
Standard of Review: The trial court ordered that the issue to be decided at trial 
was "whether the plans submitted by Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied 
with the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters." 
November 3, 1999 Order at f 3 (R. 1417-18). Nevertheless, the trial court refused to 
consider plans that were submitted by Ward to Brighton in October 1999. Brighton cites 
two federal cases, neither of which constitute binding authority, in asserting that the trial 
court's refusal to consider the latest set of plans should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. However, this Court has ruled that "Court orders are subject to the 
same rules of construction that apply to other written instruments." In re Estate of Leone. 
860 P.2d 973, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co.. 586 
P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978)). Therefore, "[w]hen a trial court interprets the unambiguous 
language of an order, [the appellate court] review[s] the court's interpretation for 
correctness." Id The trial court's refusal to consider the latest set of plans should be 
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reviewed in light of the court's earlier order ruling that the plans submitted by Ward to 
Brighton, without reference to any deadline for submission, would be considered at trial. 
In an attempt to resolve this matter, Ward made revisions to his plans to attempt to 
satisfy Brighton's concerns. Ward submitted these plans to Brighton for review on 
October 6, 1999. On October 11, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that it refused to review 
the plans submitted on October 6,1999, because it wanted to wait until the trial court 
decided its pending Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and also because it would 
not review any additional plans unless Ward paid the costs and expenses, including 
attorney's fees, associated with Brighton's review of the plans submitted in April and 
June. See October 11,1999 letter (attached hereto as Exhibit C). 
On October 26, 1999, the trial court granted Brighton's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and ruled that the issue at trial would be whether the plans 
submitted to Brighton by Ward complied with the settlement. There were no deadlines 
for submitting plans in the order. On that same day, Brighton sent Ward a letter stating: 
. . . we believe that the plans that will be litigated at trial are those Mr. Ward 
submitted on April 9, 1999 and resubmitted, with corrections, on or about 
June 16, 1999. Due to the upcoming trial date, we need clarification of this 
issue immediately. Please let us know before the end of the week if you are 
going to contend that any other set of plans will be litigated at trial. 
October 26, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 30) 
(emphasis added) (attached hereto as Exhibit E). 
On November 1, 1999, Ward's counsel informed Brighton that the latest set of 
plans submitted to Brighton on October 6, 1999 would be at issue in the trial. 
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With regard to Scott's October 26, 1999 letter requesting clarification of 
which plans will be litigated at trial, it seems clear that the plans will be the 
latest plans submitted to you. Mr. Ward submitted plans to Brighton 
Corporation in accordance with the terms of the proposed settlement 
agreement. Mr. Ward made revisions to those plans in response to your 
objections and concerns. These revisions are contained in the plans that we 
delivered to you on October 6, 1999. If you eventually decide to review 
those plans and notify us of any items that you believe are still deficient, 
Mr. Ward reserves the right to try to correct these deficiencies prior to trial. 
Nov. 1, 1999 letter from James K. Tracy to James S. Jardine (Trial Exhibit No. 39) 
(attached hereto as Exhibit F). 
Ward repeatedly pleaded with Brighton to review the latest set of plans, which had 
been delivered to Brighton two weeks before the trial court had even ruled that there was 
a binding settlement agreement in this case. Brighton insisted on trying this case on plans 
that were moot, based primarily on its insistence that Ward pay Brighton's attorney's 
fees. See, e.g. October 6, 1999, November 10, 1999, November 11, 1999, and November 
12, 1999 letters (attached hereto as Exhibit G). The trial court erred in refusing to 
consider the latest set of plans submitted by Ward, in direct contravention of its own order 
that the trial would be held on the plans submitted by Ward to Brighton. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AT TRIAL THAT BRIGHTON 
PROPERLY REJECTED WARD'S PLANS 
Standard of Review: The trial court's review of Ward's plans constitutes the 
interpretation of a contract (the settlement) reviewed for correctness giving no deference 
to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199-200. 
Factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
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1. The "finality" of Ward's plans. Brighton argues that the district court's 
"oral finding that Ward's plans were not final must be upheld because it was not clearly 
/ 
erroneous." Opposition Brief at 55. As set forth in Ward's opening brief, the plans were 
"not final" only in the sense that Ward was willing to make changes if necessary and no 
plans would be "final" until approved by Brighton. Nevertheless, even if the plans were 
not "final," that fact would not justify rejection of the plans as long as Ward had met all 
of the requirements of the settlement agreement that the trial court ruled existed between 
the parties. Brighton does not rebut Ward's assertion that he substantially complied with 
all reasonable requirements of the settlement agreement. 
2. The north porch. As set forth in Ward's opening brief, additional 
drawings of the north porch were provided to Brighton. Brighton objected to the use of a 
"heavy black line" on the drawings. Would a "dashed line" or a "dotted line" have been 
acceptable? What matters is that detailed drawings of the porch were provided. 
3. The "new" and "proposed" easements. It was undisputed that Ward 
showed the proposed easements on the plans as Brighton requested. Brighton simply 
didn't like the description of the easements as "new" and "proposed." This description 
was accurate and the trial court stated that he was not concerned about semantics on this 
issue. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:86, 143, 148). 
4. Placement of the sewer line. Brighton argues that Judge Young's few 
findings of fact should be upheld, yet ignores the fact that Judge Young stated that "if the 
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only problem here was the sewer line there wouldn't be any problem." Trial Transcript 
Vol. II (R. 1751:257, lines 17-18). 
5. South side patio. As discussed previously, Ward's plans called for a 
retaining wall that employed a terraced planter box in compliance with FCOZ. Brighton 
incorrectly argues that the settlement agreement provided that any wall in excess of six 
feet violated FCOZ, eliminating the terracing exception allowed by law. The parties did 
not agree to change existing law. 
6. Updated survey. It was undisputed that Ward gave Brighton an updated 
survey prior to the trial of this matter. There was no deadline for submitting the survey. 
7. Colorboard and transparency. At trial, and in its brief, Brighton admits 
that Ward had already given Brighton both the colorboard and a transparency. Brighton 
never told Ward that the failure to provide duplicate copies of these items was a 
deficiency and therefore waived any objection on this point. 
8. Support documents. Mary Barton admitted at trial that the prior plans 
submitted by Ward (which included the so-called "support documents") were not to be 
withdrawn until Brighton approved Ward's latest plans, which it never did. Testimony of 
Mary Barton (R. 1751:117). Further, the County will not allow public records (i.e. filed 
plans) to be physically removed. 
Although Ward disagrees that the parties entered into any binding settlement, to 
the extent an agreement existed, Ward substantially complied with that agreement and the 
trial court erred in ruling that Ward's plans did not comply with the settlement agreement. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW WARD'S EXPERT, 
CARL ERIKSSON. TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL 
Standard of Review: The parties agree that the admissibility of expert testimony is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Brighton concedes that the trial court 
ruled that Eriksson was excluded from testifying because he had not fully read the 
settlement agreement between the parties. Neither the trial court nor Brighton has 
explained why Eriksson would have had to have read the settlement agreement in order to 
testify as an expert on the issues for which he was presented. With regard to his factual 
testimony, his testimony that Salt Lake County, the governmental entity who applies the 
ordinance, had approved Ward's plans with regard to FCOZ was certainly relevant to 
whether the plans complied with FCOZ.5 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the arguments previously set forth in Ward's opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the trial court in this matter on each of the points outlined 
above and specifically requested in the Conclusion of Ward's opening brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of December, 2000. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE, L.L.P. 
Bv>-^\ fr**^ 
James fev Trac 
^\ttom5ys^S?r AppellanfGregory M. Ward 
5The issue concerning the recusal of Judge Young from this action has been 
adequately briefed. 
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"CLASSIC PLAN" PROPOSED 
AUGUST 1995-96 AND REJECTED 
BY BRIGHTON. PLAN HAS 
NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO 
SLCo FOR BUILDING PERMIT 
APPROVAL NOR TO THE 
COURT FOR APPROVAL. 
PLANS COMPLY WITH ALL 
RESTRICTIONS OF BOTH SLCo 
AND BRIGHTON. APPROVAL 
UNREASONABLY WITH HELD. 
NORTHWEST 
BUILT ON GRADE 
NORTHEAST 
SET INTO MOUNTAIN 
SOUTHWEST 
SLCo COMPLIANCE 
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DEFENDANT HAS PROPOSED FOTTR DIFFERENT CABIN PLANS TO 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION. ALL HAVE BEEN UNREASONABLY 
REJECTED. CLASSIC PLAN NOT SUBMITTED TO SLCo FOR PERMIT 
"CLASSIC PLAN" 
BETTER HOMES & GARDEN 
READY TO BUILD PLAN. NOT 
SUBMITTED TO SLCo. 1995-66 
"DESIGNER PLAN" 
PROPOSED 1994 & APRIL 1995 
APPROVED FOR BUILDING 
PERMIT SLCo JUNE 1995 
"COTTAGE PLAN" 
PROPOSED JULY 1995 
APPunvrrn vr%n RTTTT nrxrn 
"CHALET PLAN" 
PROPOSED FEBRUARY 1996 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"DESIGNER PLAN" PROPOSED 
APRIL 1994 AND REJECTED BY 
BRIGHTON. SUBJECT OF (SEPT 
1994 HEARING). REVISED TO 
MEASURE SQUARE FOOTAGE BY 
SURFACE OF EXTERIOR WALLS 
INSTEAD OF INSIDE SURFACE OF 
EXTERIOR WALLS (AREA FOOT 
PRINT vs. LIVEABLE AREA; ROOF 
PITCH 8/12; NO BASEMENT; AND 
NO STORAGE IN ATTIC). PLANS 
RESUBMITTED OCTOBER 1994 AND 
APRIL 1995. PLANS REJECTED BY 
BRIGHTON AND DISTRICT COURT 
AT JULY 1995 HEARING. COURT'S 
ACTIONS AND RULING INCLUDED 
IN APPEAL. 
NORTHWEST 
BUILT ON GRADE 
NORTH EAST 
SET INTO MOUNTAIN SOUTHWEST 
SLCo COMPLIANCE 
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"COTTAGE PLAN" PROPOSED 
JULY 1995 AND REJECTED BY 
BRIGHTON. REJECTED BY 
BRIGHTON AND NOT PRESENTED 
TO THE COURT FOR RULING. 
APPROVED FOR BUILDING PERMIT 
MAY 1996 SLCo. COMPLIED WITH 




BUILT ON GRADE 
NORTHEAST 
SET INTO MOUNTAIN 
SOUTHWEST 
SLCo COMPLIANCE 
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"CHALET PLAN" PROPOSED 
MARCH 1996 AND REJECTED 
BY BRIGHTON. COMPLIES 
WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS 
AND APPROVED BY SLCo. FOR 
BUILDING PERMIT MAY 1996. 
UNREASONABLY REJECTED 
DISTRICT COURT NOVEMBER 
1999. COURT'S ACTIONS AND 
RULING INCLUDED IN APPEAL. 
NORTHWEST 
BUILT ON GRADE 
NORTH EAST 
SET INTO MOUNTAIN SOUTHWEST SLCo COMPLIANCE 
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I 
1 A WHAT I SAID IN MY TESTIMONY WAS, AGAIN, 
2 NOT TO BE ARGUMENTATIVE, THAT IT WAS MY BELIEF THAT 
3 SHE DIDN'T WANT TO EVER BUILD ON THE PROPERTY. AND , 
4 THAT WAS MY IMPRESSION. 
5^ • Q ARE YOU AWARE THAT A BRIEF YOUR LAWYER'S 
6 FILED WITH THIS COURT EXPRESSLY SAYS THAT SHE TOLD 
7 YOU SHE WOULD NEVER ALLOW YOU TO BUILD ON THE 
8 PROPERTY? 
9 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
10 Q OKAY. DO YOU NOW REPRESENT THAT THAT 
11 ISN'T A CORRECT STATEMENT OF YOUR MEMORY? 
12 A THE CORRECT STATEMENT OF MY MEMORY IS IN 
13 THE FALL OF 19 9 0 I VISITED MY AUNT MARY AT THE 
14 CABIN IN BRIGHTON. AND I WAS UP THERE, IT WAS A 
15 BEAUTIFUL AUTUMN DAY, AND MISSING THE PROPERTY I 
16 THOUGHT I'D DRIVE UP AND JUST SEE HOW IT WAS GOING, 
17 BECAUSE I CLOSE IT ALMOST EVERY YEAR, FOR THE LAST 
18 15 YEARS. AND MY AUNT MARY WAS UP THERE CLEANING 
19 AND STRAIGHTENING UP THE CABIN. AND I HEARD THAT 
2 0 SHE BOUGHT NEW CURTAINS AND THAT SHE HAD BEEN 
21 WORKING ON THE CABIN. I WAS NOT INVITED IN, BUT 
2 2 THAT'S OKAY, BECAUSE SHE WAS BUSY CLEANING. AND MY 
2 3 AUNT MARY SAYS, GREG, I'LL NEVER ALLOW YOU TO BUILD 
24 ON THE PROPERTY UP HERE SO YOU MIGHT AS WELL FIND 
2 5 ANOTHER PLACE TO BUILD. 
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James K. Tracy, Esq. 
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' ; UL I' : . 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Coats, et al. 
Dear Doug and James: 
I received last week your letter of October 6, 1999 and the enclosed plans. I am 
writing in response to the letter's statement that the modified plans are usubmitted for final 
review and approval by Brighton Corporation in hopes that this matter can finally be 
resolved." First, there is a procedural impediment to the review of these plans that precludes 
their present review. As you know, the parties are in disagreement over whether the 
settlement agreement is enforceable. Because review of the October 6, 1999 plans would 
differ depending on whether they were reviewed consistent with the settlement agreement or 
under the general review which existed prior to the settlement agreement, the plans have not 
and cannot be reviewed until the Court rules on our motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement. Therefore, Brighton Corporation will not undertake to review the plans until that 
matter is determined. 
Second, there is an order in place providing that Brighton Corporation may require, as 
a condition of reviewing additional plans, reimbursement of its professional expenses and oth^r Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas J. Parry 
James K. Tracy 
October 11, 1999 
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out-of-pocket costs. Heretofore, Brighton Corporation has submitted bills for costs to your 
client in the total amount of $5,446.50, which have not been paid. Brighton Corporation is 
unwilling to incur further professional expense in costs necessary to its review of the October 
6, 1999 plans unless it is compensated for its expenses since the date of the Order. 
Third, your letter of October 6, 1999 states that "the proposed cabin is on grade on the 
west side and the new main floor elevation is 119 feet." Since we have not reviewed the 
plans, we do not fully understand the reference to the main floor elevation at 119 feet. 
However, with respect to previously submitted plans, we note that no final survey of the actual 
elevations of the property has been obtained by your client, as contemplated in the settlement 
agreement, and Brighton Corporation regards such final determination of relevant elevations as 
essential to any review. 
Fourth, in light of the foregoing, we do not believe that the plans submitted to us on 
October 6, 1999 can fairly be the plans considered by the Court at the trial on November 17, 
1999. Therefore, we assume that trial will focus on Brighton Corporation's review of the 
plans submitted to us on June 11, 1999. 
Please call if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
• & 
cc: Brighton Corporation 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 








Case No: 940905453 PR 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 




Reporter: GAYLE CAMPBELL 
JAMES S. JARDINE 
DAVID M CONNORS 
Clerk: taunah 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court for a pre-trial conference. 
Counsel state a possible resolution may be reached. Issues 
discussed: 1) location of porch on north side & retaining wall. 
Mr. Jardine states he will respond within 3 business days after 
receiving needed informaion. 2) Need for final attached 
plans. Mr. Jardine will respond within 5 business days after 
receiving plans, will clarify any questions re plans, reserves 
right to reject if any deviations made on plans. 3) Rights 
re water lines and upkeep. Mr. Jardine is to prepare and submit 
order re posible resolution. The trial setting on 2-26-98 is 
vacaed pursuant to possible resolution. 
n n n A n 
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James S. Jardine (A1647) 
Robert P. Hill (A1492) 
Scott A. Hagen (A4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
HAH OH 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
—ooOoo-— 




ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an 
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as 
JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
—ooOoo— 
The above-entitled action came on for a final pre-trial conference on February 18, 
1998. Plaintiff Brighton Corporation was represented by James S. Jardine and defendants 
00747 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
were represented by David M. Connors. Based on the discussions with the Court and the
 { 
stipulation of the parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The trial date beginning February 26, 1998 is stricken. 
2. As a first step, defendants will provide to plaintiff specific and detailed 
plans showing the location of the proposed porch on the north side of the 
proposed cabin, including any proposed retaining walls and required 
footings. Such plans shall also include all relevant elevations. The 
purpose of the review is to determine whether the porch, the retaining 
walls and the graded slopes will interfere with plaintiff s waterline. 
Plaintiff shall respond with its approval, disapproval or questions within 
three business days of receipt of the plans. 
3. If plaintiff approves the proposed porch design, defendants shall proceed 
to prepare a complete set of final plans of the proposed cabin, with all 
relevant elevations clearly noted. These plans will be reviewed by 
Brighton Corporation including to determine, where applicable, whether 
they are consistent with prior discussions between the parties. It is the 
objective of the parties that these plans be sufficiently detailed and 
specific that, to the fullest extent possible, no ambiguity and uncertainty 
remain. Plaintiff shall respond with its approval, disapproval or questions 
with respect to the detailed plans or deviations from prior discussions 
within five business days of its receipt. 
2 
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4. With respect to plaintiffs waterline easement, the parties will attempt to 
negotiate a resolution of issues, including but not limited to access, 
maintenance, repair, the status of the 1991 adjustment of the waterline 
location, and defendants' alleged future right to seek relocation of the 
waterline. If those negotiations are not successful, the parties have agreed 
to proceed to resolve any remaining issues by written submission to the 
Court. The negotiations and possible submissions to the Court regarding 
the waterline issues shall proceed independent of, and shall not delay, the 
review of defendants' proposed cabin plans. 
DATED this V ^ d a y of SXaary, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Connors 
Attorneys for Defendants 
402534 
3 r\ r\ *** M r\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Exhibit E 
^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J 
"1 
/NZO W WATSON. JR 
EPHEN B NEBEKER 
.4ERSCHEL J . SAPERSTEIN 
OON B. ALLEN 
CLARK P. GILES 
ROBERT M.GRAHAM 
NARRVEL E HALL 
HERBERT C LIVSEY 
PAUL S. FELT 
O JAY CURTIS 
GERALO T SNOW 
ALAN A ENKE 
WESTON L HARRIS 
JONATHAN A. DIBBLE 
SCOTT HANCOCK CLARK 
STEVEN H. GUNN 
JAMES S JAROINE 
ALLAN T. BRINKERHOFF 
JANET HUGIE SMITH 
OOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
ROBERT P. HILL 
FLOYO ANOREW JENSEN 
OAVIO K. LAURITZEN 
ALLEN L. ORR 
A. ROBERT THORUP 
JOHN P HARRINGTON 
LARRY G. MOORE 
8 JANELL GRENIER 
BRUCE L. OLSON 
JOHN A. AOAMS 
OOUGLAS M MONSON 
CRAIG CARLILE 
JAMES M OESTER 
ELLEN J . O. TOSCANO 
KEVIN G. GLAOE 
LESTER K. ESSIG 
IRA B. RUBINFELO 
STEVEN T. WATERMAN 
STEPHEN C TINGEY 
JOHN R. MAOSEN 
KEITH A KELLY 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARK M. BETTILYON 
RICK L. ROSE 
RICK B. HOGGARO 
LISA A. YERKOVICH 
BRENT O WRIOE 
LORIN E. PATTERSON 
MICHAEL E. BLUE 
SCOTT A HAGEN 
STEVEN W. CALL 
CAMERON M. HANCOCK 
ELAINE A MONSON 
KATIE A. ECCLES 
CALVIN C. CURTIS 
MARK A. COTTER 
R. GARY WINGER 
KELLY J . APPLEGATE 
ROBERT O. RICE 
THOMAS A. MECHAM 
ARTHUR B. BERGER 
FREOERICK R. THALER. JR 
JOHN W. MACKAY 
ERIC O. BARTON 
McKAY M. PEARSON 
MARK W. PUGSLEY 
JOHN O. MORRIS 
MICHAEL 0. CREER 
JONI J . JONES 
OANIEL W. WALKER 
PAUL C. BURKE 
E LAIN A M. MARAGAKIS 
JOAN M. ANDREWS 
O 2ACHARY WISEMAN 
OAVIO O. GIBBON 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE 400 
P. O. BOX -45365 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 54145-0385 
TELEPHONE (BOD 532-1500 
FACSIMILE NO. (SOI> 532-7543 
PROVO OFFICE 
92 NORTH UNIVERSITY AVENUE 
SUITE 2IO 
PROVO, UTAH 84601-4420 
TELEPHONE (BOO 342-2400 
FACSIMILE NO (SOD 375-8379 
OF COUNSEL 
M JOHN ASHTON 
ROBERT A ALSOP 
WILLIAM A MARSHALL 
VALERIE A LONGMtRE 
October 26, 1999 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Greg Ward, et aL 
Dear Doug: 
Attached is a proposed order reflecting Judge Young's ruling at the hearing on 
Brighton's motion to enforce settlement agreement. Please review it and advise me as soon as 
possible whether you are able to approve it as to form. 
Based on the denial of your petition for extraordinary writ and the grant of the motion 
to enforce the settlement agreement, we believe the plans that will be litigated at trial are those 
Mr. Ward submitted on April 9, 1999 and resubmitted, with corrections, on or about June 16, 
1999. Due to the upcoming trial date, we need clarification of this issue immediately. Please 
let us know before the end of the week if you are going to contend that any other set of plans 
will be litigated at trial. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Scott A. Hagen 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
PARRY ANDERSON & MA 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
1270 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
JAMES K. TRACY 60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3434 
FAX: (801) 521-3484 
November 1, 1999 
VIA FACSIMILE NO. 532-7543 and REGULAR MAIL 
James S. Jardine 
Scott A. Hagen 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Coats, et al.: Case No. 940905453 
Dear Jim and Scott: 
As you know, the Court ruled on October 22, 1999, that there is a 
binding setdement agreement in this case. You have argued that all of the terms of 
the proposed setdement agreement are contained in the stipulation that was read into 
the record on March 3, 1999, as reflected in your proposed order that we approved as 
to form and filed with the Court. Of course, we do not agree that the Court's order is 
correct and we wonder how this case can be resolved on the basis of that order, but be 
that as it may, there is no requirement that Mr. Ward pay for your review of the plans 
anywhere in the terms of what the Court ruled to be an enforceable setdement 
agreement. To the extent that you were entitied to such payment, you compromised 
that right as a part of the setdement you claim exists. 
With regard to Scott's October 26, 1999 letter requesting clarification of 
which plans will be litigated at trial, it seems clear that the plans will be the latest 
plans submitted to you. Mr. Ward submitted plans to Brighton Corporation in 
accordance with the terms of the proposed setdement agreement. Mr. Ward made 
revisions to those plans in response to your objections and concerns. These revisions 
are contained in the plans that we delivered to you on October 6, 1999. If you 
eventually decide to review those plans and notify us of any items that you believe are 
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There is no legitimate basis for you to refuse to consider plans that 
contain revisions addressing concerns that you have raised. There is also no 
legitimate basis for you to demand payment of fees for your review of the plans when 
such payment was hot a term of the setdement you claim exists. 
We would ask that you prompdy review the plans submitted to you on 
October 6, 1999, and advise us whether your client will approve these plans, and if 




cc: Gregory M. Ward 
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JAMES K. TRACY 
LAW OFFICES OF 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
A PROFKSSIONAL CORPORATION 
12 70 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3434 
FAX: (801) 521-3484 
E-MAIL: 
parry-law@utah-intcr.nct 
October 6, 1999 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
James S. Jardine 
Scott A. Hagen 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Coats, et al.: Case No. 940905453 
Dear Jim and Scott: 
Please find enclosed another copy of the plans previously submitted to you by 
Greg Ward. These plans are the same as prior plans, with the exception that the cabin 
has been slightly rotated to reduce your client's concern regarding cuts into the mountain, 
to provide a more reasonable placement of the cabin on the lot, and to address your 
client's concern the cabin was too close to their water line. The proposed cabin is on-
grade on the west side and the new main floor elevation is 119 feet. Additionally, I 
believe that most of your objections to the General Site Notes and General Information 
have been addressed. The attached plans are submitted for final review and approval by 
Brighton Corporation in hopes that this matter can finally be resolved. 




cc: Gregory M. Ward 
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November 10, 1999 
James K. Tracy, Esq. 
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Greg Ward, et al. 
Dear James: 
We received your letter of November 9 and respond on behalf of Brighton Corporation. 
We regard your position on which plans to litigate as wrong for two reasons. 
First, as we explained in our November 5 letter (and earlier), Brighton Corporation has 
declined to review the latest set of plans because Ward ignored Brighton's invoices for costs. 
Although you claim there is nothing in the settlement agreement requiring such payment, you 
do not address the rationale stated in our November 5 letter. Specifically, you fail to address 
or show how the settlement abrogated the Order of Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, as we 
have noted before, the February 1999 order (that it was reasonable for Brighton to condition 
review of further plan on payment of professional costs) has continuing legal and logical effect, 
i.e. that it was and still is reasonable for Brighton to require reimbursement before further 
review of new plans, and the settlement agreement does not make it now unreasonable. 
Second, the settlement contemplates a specific set of plans with specific changes. 
Indeed, the settlement was very specific and precise to make it clear and easy for your client to 
comply. You now have given us new plans (as shown by the raised main floor elevation), not 
corrected plans, as required by the settlement. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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James K. Tracy, Esq. 
November 10, 1999 
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As you will recall, the Court has stated it will try this case once. We agreed to a 
specific program of review regarding a specific set of plans. Brighton's intent was to achieve 
clarity. Ward's "rotation" concept confuses and frustrates the specific program set out in the 
settlement agreement. 
Thus, if Ward truly wants review cf cabin plans, he needs to pay the invoices and 
correct the chalet plans (rejected by our letter dated June 23, 1999) as stated in the October 28, 
1998 and February 22, 1999 letters, as modified in the March 3, 1999 hearing. Brighton will 
not review plans not submitted pursuant to the settlement agreement. 
Very truly yours, ~ * 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Scott A. Hagen 
cc: Brighton Corporation 
503193 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
A PROFFSSIONAL CORPORATION 
1270 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
JAMES K. TRACY 60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3434 
FAX: (801) 521-3484 
November 11, 1999 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
James S. Jardine 
Scott A. Hagen 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Coats, et al.: Case No. 940905453 
Dear Jim and Scott: 
Please find enclosed a revised Site Plan that contains a few more changes that 
you have requested. You should be able to review these changes in five minutes or less. 
The changes are as follows: 
1. Mr. Ward's proposed sewer line has been moved to the west side of the 
property as you requested in your October 28, 1998 letter. 
2. The words "disputed" in connection with Brighton Corporation's water 
line and sewer line have been removed as you requested in your October 28, 1998 letter. 
3. Kimble Shaw has written the exact elevations of each outside corner of 
the cabin as you requested in your February 22, 1999 letter. 
4. General Information Note 18 has been deleted in accordance with your 
request in your June 23, 1999 letter. 
With regard to the issue of payment of your attorney's fees, you are incorrect 
when you state that we failed to address that issue in our November 9, 1999 letter. We 
clearly stated that pursuant to the Court's Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment you could have required the reimbursement of legal and professional fees and costs 
as a part of Brighton Corporation's review of plans. However, YOU DID NOT STATE 
THAT REQUIREMENT AS A PART OF THE SETTLEMENT. In other words, the partial 
summary judgment Order stated that it would be reasonable for you to require payment of 
E - M A I L : 
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fees as a condition of review. BUT YOU DID NOT DO SO. If you had, Mr. Ward would 
not have agreed to the conditional settlement. It is not a matter of abrogating the order as 
you put it. Rather, it is a matter of your failing to state the payment of fees as a term of our 
settlement agreement that you claim exists. I requested you to point out exactly where in the 
October 28, 1998 letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, or the March 3, 1999 transcript that 
you list the payment of fees for review as a condition of the settlement agreement. You have 
failed to do so for the obvious reason that it does not exist. 
Second, these are not new plans. The basic plan has remained the same for 
years. We have made modifications to the basic plan in an attempt to meet your concerns, 
even though we believed your concerns to be without merit and raised in bad faith. In my 
last letter I stated that the main floor elevation was raised as a result of rotating the cabin. 
Upon further review, I do not believe that statement was correct. In fact, the cabin was 
rotated to address your concern listed in Item VII(c) of your June 23, 1999 letter that the 
location of the front porch might encroach on the waterline easement. The rotation of the 
cabin resolves this concern. Raising the cabin approximately two feet addresses your 
concern listed in Item 11(e) of your June 23, 1999 letter that the retaining wall was too high. 
Raising the cabin slightly reduces the height of the retaining wall. Mr. Shaw will testify that 
it would not be prudent to build the cabin at 116'10" and that the putting the main level at 
119' is more appropriate for drainage and other reasons. If you disagree, please let us know 
why. 
Sincerely, 
James K. Tracy -
Enclosure 
cc: Gregory M. Ward 
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VALERIE A. LONGMIRE 
November 12, 1999 
James K. Tracy 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Coats, et al. 
Dear James: 
We have received your letter of November 11, 1999, and the site plan that you sent 
with the letter. 
We will submit it to our client, of course, but we view this not as a submission pursuant 
to the settlement agreement, but as revisions to the new plan your client submitted in October 
1999 after the plan submitted pursuant to the settlement agreement was rejected. 
For the reasons stated in our letter of November 10, 1999, Ward's failure to pay 
Brighton's invoices excused Brighton's duty to review the plans. Moreover, as explained in 
the same letter, the rotated design first submitted in October 1999 is not the cabin contemplated 
in the settlement agreement. While rotating the cabin on the site may avoid the FCOZ 
violation that your client has never properly addressed, it does so not by stepping down the 
patio, as promised in the settlement agreement, but by suggesting an entirely different 
placement on the property. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
J^AMK 
*ni7ai 
Scott A. Hagen 
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